Blog / BitLocker, the FBI, and the Illusion of Control

When it recently became known that Microsoft had helped the FBI decrypt BitLocker-encrypted data carriers, there was widespread outrage. People were quick to talk about “backdoors,” broken encryption, and how BitLocker was clearly unreliable. But as is so often the case, the real problem lies less in the technology itself than in who has control over the encryption key.

This case is a good opportunity to take a closer look: What really happened? Why was access possible? And what does this say about our understanding of encryption and cloud services?

What Happened?

The case that came to light involved a criminal investigation in which the FBI seized several laptops. These devices were encrypted with BitLocker, the hard disk encryption feature integrated into Windows.

The FBI was still able to decrypt the data because Microsoft was able to provide the corresponding recovery keys. These keys were stored in the Microsoft account of the person concerned. Microsoft was legally obliged to disclose this information by court order.

It is important to clarify one thing: Microsoft did not “crack” BitLocker. There was no security breach, no secret master key, and no technical backdoor into the encryption itself. Microsoft was able to help because they had the keys.

Bitlocker Is Secure—But Not Automatically Private

BitLocker is technically considered a robust encryption solution. The data on a device cannot be read without the appropriate key. The problem does not arise with encryption, but with key management.

By default, Windows offers to save the BitLocker recovery key in your Microsoft account. This is convenient because if you forget your password or change your hardware, you can simply retrieve the key online.

However, this convenience has a consequence: if Microsoft holds the key, Microsoft also has the ability to pass it on—for example, to law enforcement agencies with the appropriate warrant.

Encryption therefore only fully protects data from third parties if the key remains exclusively under the control of the user.

The Real Misunderstanding: Encryption ≠ Key Control

Many users equate encryption with complete control. In practice, however, this is often not the case.

A rough distinction can be made between:

• Client-side encryption with external key management. This means that the provider has access to the key.
• Zero-knowledge encryption. Here, the provider has no technical access to the key.

BitLocker with a cloud-backed recovery key clearly falls into the first category. The data is encrypted, but not exclusively for the owner.

The Microsoft case therefore does not demonstrate a failure of BitLocker, but rather a structural problem with modern cloud ecosystems. Convenience features often undermine data sovereignty without anyone noticing.

Why Many Are Surprised

The strong reaction to this case shows one thing above all else: many people do not know where their encryption keys are stored.

Cloud backups, automatic synchronization, and preset security options are standard today. They lower the barrier to entry, increase user-friendliness, and quietly shift responsibility from the user to the provider.

This leads to a misleading assumption:

“My data is encrypted, so no one can access it.”

Technically correct would be:

“My data is encrypted, but someone else has the spare key.”

Access by Authorities Is Not a Special Case

Another important point: Access by authorities is not an unusual scenario.

If providers have access to keys or unencrypted data, they are legally obliged in many countries to hand them over if ordered to do so. This applies not only to Microsoft, but also to other major cloud providers.

The crucial question is therefore not:

“Do I trust Microsoft?”

But rather:

“Do I want to give a provider the technical ability to decrypt my data?”

What Users Can Learn From This

The case offers a valuable lesson – regardless of the specific product:

• Encryption is only as strong as key management
• Cloud backups of keys always mean a loss of control
• Security is not a default setting, but a conscious decision
• If you want maximum privacy, you also have to take responsibility for keys

This does not mean that cloud services are fundamentally insecure. But it does mean that you should understand which security model you are using and what compromises it entails.

How Cryptomator Helps in Such Cases: Zero Knowledge Instead of Key Storage

This is precisely where solutions such as Cryptomator and Cryptomator Hub come in. Unlike many integrated encryption functions, Cryptomator consistently follows a zero-knowledge principle.

This means that data is encrypted locally on the device before it can even be uploaded to the cloud. The key difference lies in key management. Cryptomator does not store passwords, recovery keys, or master keys.

Neither cloud providers nor Cryptomator itself have technical access to the encrypted content or the keys required to decrypt it. Even if a cloud service—such as Microsoft OneDrive, Google Drive, or Dropbox—were required to disclose data, it would only contain unreadable, encrypted files.

The difference is particularly clear in the context of the BitLocker case:

• With BitLocker and a cloud-backed recovery key, the provider can issue the key
• With Cryptomator, this key only exists with the user themselves
• Access by third parties is technically impossible, not just organizationally

This deliberately shifts responsibility back to the users. It requires a little more personal responsibility—for example, when it comes to handling passwords securely—but in return offers a significantly higher degree of control and privacy.

This model is particularly important for sensitive data of any kind. You can’t pass on something you don’t own yourself.

Conclusion: Encryption Is Not a Feature, but a Responsibility

The BitLocker-FBI case does not reveal a secret backdoor or a breach of modern cryptography. It reveals something much more fundamental: how easily we trade control for convenience – often without even realizing it.

True data sovereignty does not come from encryption alone, but from exclusive control over the keys. Anyone who relinquishes this control should at least be aware of what that means.

Or to put it another way: Do you know who has your encryption key?